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Abstract 
Recent research by legal scholars suggests that the law 
might inevitably be transformed into legal micro-
directives consisting of legal rules that are derived 
from legal standards or that are otherwise produced 
automatically or via the consequent derivations of 
legal goals and then propagated via automation for 
everyday use as readily accessible lawful directives 
throughout society. This paper examines and extends 
the legal micro-directives theories in three crucial 
respects: (1) By indicating that legal micro-directives 
are likely to be AI-enabled and evolve over time in 
scope and velocity across the autonomous levels of AI 
Legal Reasoning, (2) By exploring the tradeoffs 
between legal standards and legal rules as the 
imprinters of the micro-directives, and (3) By 
illuminating a set of brittleness exposures that can 
undermine legal micro-directives and proffering 
potential mitigating remedies to seek greater 
robustness in the instantiation and promulgation of 
such AI-powered lawful directives. 
Keywords: AI, artificial intelligence, autonomy, 
autonomous levels, legal reasoning, law, lawyers, 
practice of law, legal micro-directives, rules, standards 
 
 
1 Background on Legal Micro-Directives 
 
Recent research by legal scholars advises that the law 
might inevitably be transformed into legal micro-
directives consisting of legal rules that are derived 
from legal standards or that are otherwise produced 
automatically or via the consequent derivations of 
legal goals [8] [9] [28] [32]. These legal micro-
directives would be propagated via automation for 
everyday use as readily accessible, lawful directives, 
throughout society.  
 
This paper examines and extends the legal micro-
directives theories in three crucial respects:  
 
(1) By indicating that legal micro-directives are 
likely to be AI-enabled and evolve over time in 
scope and velocity across the autonomous levels of 
AI Legal Reasoning [20] [22],  
 
(2) By exploring the tradeoffs between legal 
standards and legal rules as the imprinters of the 
micro-directives, and  
 
(3) By illuminating a set of brittleness exposures 
that can undermine legal micro-directives and 
proffering potential mitigating remedies to seek 
greater robustness in the instantiation and 
promulgation of such AI-enabled lawful directives. 
 
In Section 1 of this paper, the topic of legal micro-
directives is introduced and addressed. Doing so 
establishes the groundwork for the subsequent 
sections. Section 2 introduces the Levels of Autonomy 
(LoA) of AI Legal Reasoning (AILR), which is 
instrumental in the discussions undertaken in Section 
3. Section 3 provides an indication of the AI-
enablement of legal micro-directives, along with 
exploring the tradeoffs of legal rules versus legal 
standards, and the brittleness facets thereof. The final 
section, Section 4, covers additional considerations 
and recommendations for future research.  
 
This paper then consists of these four sections: 
• Section 1: Background on Legal  
                 Micro-Directives 
• Section 2: Autonomous Levels of  
                        AI Legal Reasoning 
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• Section 3: Legal Micro-Directives and  
                 AI Enablement 
• Section 4: Additional Considerations and 
                 Future Research 
 
1.1 Legal Micro-Directives 
 
In the research literature about the law, there has been 
a longstanding philosophical dialogue about the nature 
of legal standards and legal rules as two keystone 
elements of the law [2] [25] [26] [28]. The general 
view is that legal standards are typically indicative of 
broad strokes about the delineation of lawful behavior 
while legal rules are more tightly specified. Legal 
standards are considered open to interpretation and 
flexible, thus able to encompass a wide variety of acts 
and activities that would be assessed as lawful, but do 
so at the potential peril or downside that loose 
interpretation can lead to unlawful efforts that 
seemingly were feasible within the scope implied. 
Legal rules on the other hand are generally considered 
of a specific nature, being more pinpoint descriptive 
and reducing interpretive uncertainty about what the 
law portends [37] [42] [49].  
 
Casey and Niblett [09] indicate this about legal 
standards and legal rules: “Rules are precise and ex 
ante in nature. Rules indicate to an individual whether 
certain behavior will violate or comply with the law. 
When a rule is enacted, effort must be undertaken by 
lawmakers to give full and precise content to the law 
before the individuals act. Standards, on the other 
hand, are imprecise when they are enacted. The exact 
content of the law comes after an individual acts, as 
judges and other adjudicators determine whether the 
individual’s specific behavior in a particular context 
violates the standard.”  
 
Furthermore, with respect to uncertainty, they indicate 
[09]: “Uncertainty about the content of a law is greater 
with standards than with simple rules. When regulated 
by a simple rule, an individual will more likely know 
whether her behavior is allowed or prohibited. When 
regulated by a standard, on the other hand, the 
individual does not know how any particular judge 
with wide discretion will apply the standard to the 
facts. She may not know what behavior a judge will 
consider reasonable.” 
 
To readily depict this difference between legal 
standards and legal rules, a frequently provided 
example is the use case of automobile driving and laws 
related to driving that are legal standards versus 
driving-related legal rules. Per McGinnis and Wasick 
[32]: “The prototypical example of a rule-based law is 
a speed limit that holds that a driver must drive at 
sixty-five miles per hour or less. In contrast, a standard 
‘requires the judge both to discover the facts of a 
particular situation and to assess them in terms of the 
purposes or social values embodied in the standard.’ A 
standards-based speed limit, for example, would hold 
that a driver must drive at a ‘reasonable’ speed.” 
 
Per the work of Kaplow, as summarized and recounted 
in [32], legal rules would tend toward presumably 
greater conformity to the law: “If actors are able to 
inform themselves as to the consequences of the law 
beforehand, they are more likely to act in accordance 
with the law. Under a system of rule-based law, the 
legal norm is stated before an individual has the 
opportunity to act, giving them the chance to inform 
themselves about the law and act accordingly. In a 
standards-based law, the individual does not know the 
exact outlines of the law until it is given content by the 
court. This lack of information would result in less 
conformity with the law.” 
 
With the emergence of computer-based automation 
that is increasingly becoming ubiquitous throughout 
society, a relatively new concept or theory has been 
ventured in the realm of the law that has been coined 
as the use of legal micro-directives.  
 
Essentially, a legal micro-directive is a legal rule that 
is made available via automation so that society can be 
made aware of the legal rule in a real-time and 
anyplace manner. Casey and Niblett [08] define micro-
directives in this way: “Ultimately, law will exist in a 
catalogue of precisely tailored directives, specifying 
exactly what is permissible in every unique situation. 
In this world, when a citizen faces a legal decision, she 
is informed of exactly how to comply with every 
relevant law before she acts. The citizen does not have 
to weigh the reasonableness of her actions nor does 
she have to search for the content of a law. She 
follows a simple directive that is optimized for her 
situation. We call these refined laws ‘micro-
directives.’ These micro-directives will be largely 
automated.” From a lawmaker’s perspective, these 
legal micro-directives are characterized as a new form 
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of law [08]: “The lawmaker’s decision between rules 
and standards will become unnecessary. A new form 
of law – the micro-directive – will emerge. The micro-
directive provides ex ante behavioral prescriptions 
finely tailored to every possible scenario.” 
 
Returning to the example of automobile driving, 
consider this scenario about the use of legal micro-
directives [08]: “To see how the mechanism might 
work, consider the regulation of traffic speed. In a 
world of rules and standards, a legislature hoping to 
optimize safety and travel time could enact a rule (a 
sixty miles-per-hour speed limit) or a standard (“drive 
reasonably”). With microdirectives, however, the law 
looks quite different. The legislature merely states its 
goal. Machines then design the law as a vast catalog of 
context-specific rules to optimize that goal. From this 
catalog, a specific microdirective is selected and 
communicated to a particular driver (perhaps on a 
dashboard display) as a precise speed for the specific 
conditions she faces. For example, a microdirective 
might provide a speed limit of 51.2 miles per hour for 
a particular driver with twelve years of experience on a 
rainy Tuesday at 3:27 p.m. The legislation remains 
constant, but the microdirective updates as quickly as 
conditions change.” 
 
At first glance, the adoption of legal micro-directives 
might seem a mere technological advancement and 
thus otherwise not be especially significant regarding 
the nature of the law and its ramifications. According 
to Casey and Niblett [09], they foresee that legal 
micro-directives could have a potent and enduring 
impact on law in many vital ways: “First, it will 
change the broad institutional balance of power in our 
political and legal system. Second, it may change the 
development and substantive content of legislative 
policy. Third, it will transform the practice and 
training of law. Fourth, it will have moral and ethical 
consequences for individual citizens, altering their 
day-to-day decision-making process and changing 
their relationship with lawmakers and government.”  
 
In that impactful sense, it is worthwhile therefore to 
provide additional attention to the nature and scope of 
legal micro-directives. 
 
One core element consists of the notion that the legal 
micro-directives can be readily changed, doing so at a 
velocity unlike that of today’s laws, and furthermore 
that the legal micro-directives will be better targeted 
[09]: “The technological changes will allow the law to 
be more precise, better calibrated, more flexible, more 
consistent, and less biased.”   
 
Likening this to the emergence of autonomous 
vehicles and self-driving cars, it is said that law will 
become self-driving (borrowing the phrase but not 
intending to somehow be commingled with 
autonomous vehicles per se) [09]: “If the state of the 
world changes, or if the objective of the law is 
changed, the vast array of micro-directives will 
instantly update. These laws will be better calibrated, 
more precise, and more consistent. The law will 
become, for all intents and purposes, ‘self-driving.’” 
 
If one conceives of the legal micro-directives as a 
variant of the notion of a legal rule, this implies that 
legal micro-directives will inherit the same advantages 
of legal rules as stated earlier in comparing the legal 
standards difficulty versus the benefits of legal rules 
[32]: “This difficulty is a problem both ex ante and ex 
post. Ex ante, an actor subject to a law wants to 
understand what actions the law requires, so that he 
may avoid liability. Instead of simply looking up a 
statute, as in the case of a rule, an actor subject to a 
standard would need to try and collect the relevant 
case law to determine the outlines of the standard and 
how it applies to him. Ex post, an actor subject to a 
standard would have to go through the same process to 
determine the likelihood of success at trial. At trial, the 
judge has the additional burden of determining the 
proper application of the standard to the particular 
facts of the case.”  
 
And thus, the benefits of using legal rules [32]: “If 
actors are able to inform themselves as to the 
consequences of the law beforehand, they are more 
likely to act in accordance with the law. Under a 
system of rule-based law, the legal norm is stated 
before an individual has the opportunity to act, giving 
them the chance to inform themselves about the law 
and act accordingly. In a standards-based law, the 
individual does not know the exact outlines of the law 
until it is given content by the court. This lack of 
information would result in less conformity with the 
law.” 
 
Some assert that micro-directives might entirely 
replace legal standards and legal rules, while others 
opine that there will still be legal standards, perhaps 
depicted as legal goals, out of which legal rules will be 
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derived, and then out of which legal micro-directives 
are specified and promulgated.  
 
In that latter perspective, lawmakers would continue to 
work at a legal standards or legal goals vantage point, 
and then be able to automatically have legal rules and 
legal micro-directives spawned from those legal 
standards. Those that advocate the contrary posture 
that all legal standards and legal rules will be 
eliminated and replaced entirely by micro-directives 
are apt to argue that there should not be any gaps per 
se between legal standards and the resultant legal 
micro-directives, while those that assert the continuing 
importance of legal standards are apt to suggest that 
lawmakers would not be readily able to produce law at 
a legal micro-directive level, and would be more 
amenable to establishing legal standards or legal goals 
that would then generate appropriately aligned legal 
micro-directives.  
 
Open-ended questions about legal micro-directives 
include whether these legal micro-directives would 
necessarily be ascertained by humans or might be 
determined or generated via some form of AI Legal 
Reasoning (AILR) system or by other automated 
means [20] [22].  
 
In the work by McGinnis and Wasick [32], they use 
the phrase “dynamic rules” defined as: “Dynamic rules 
are rules that automatically change without 
intervention by the rule giver according to changes in 
future conditions that the rule itself comprehensively 
and accurately fixes. As computation increases, it 
becomes easier to add complex conditions, both 
because these conditions can be continually monitored 
and because the application of the new rule can be 
more readily calculated.” 
 
The changes in the legal dynamic rules could be tied to 
data changes [32]: “Dynamic rules are rules that are 
tied directly to real world empirical data, so that they 
automatically update as the data to which they are tied 
changes. Dynamic rules can therefore increase the 
ability of rules to adapt to continuously changing 
circumstances rather than await another legislative 
decision to adapt.”  An example given to highlight 
how dynamic rules might function includes the realm 
of tax brackets [32]: “There are several examples of 
dynamic rules that are currently in effect, many with 
very successful results. For instance, the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 indexed tax brackets to 
inflation. Before this change, taxpayers experienced 
‘bracket creep’ when inflation pushed them into higher 
tax brackets while their purchasing power remained 
the same.281 This led to a period during the 1970s 
when tax brackets had to be frequently changed by 
Congress in order to keep pace with inflation. By 
indexing brackets, Congress eliminated the need to 
revisit tax policy solely due to the inevitable increase 
of inflation.” 
 
Given the tremendous volume of potential legal 
dynamic rules or legal micro-directives that could end 
up being produced, it seems unlikely that lawmakers 
could cope with or manage laws at that granular of a 
level, and thus would need to be able to continue 
lawmaking at a higher level [32]: “In theory, rules 
could also be changed by legislatures or regulatory 
bodies in response to new information. In practice, 
however, rules tend to be sticky even in the face of 
changing circumstances that should modify them. 
Legislatures tend to be reactive to crises and thus may 
not update rules continuously as new information 
becomes available. The legislatures’ crowded agendas 
often make it difficult to find time to update rules.” 
 
At the mid-level and granular level of the law, 
automation potentially consisting of AILR could be 
the spawning mechanism for legal rules and legal 
micro-directives, meanwhile, human lawmakers would 
continue their efforts at higher-levels of lawmaking 
[09]: “Human policy makers will still play a crucial 
role. Just as self-driving cars will determine the safest 
and fastest route to a destination selected by humans, 
self-driving laws will determine the optimal way to 
achieve a policy objective chosen by humans. Even 
though the micro-directives are automated and update 
in real time, human lawmakers will be required to set 
the broad objectives of the law.” 
 
There are potential downsides to the advent of legal 
micro-directives, including dystopian possibilities of 
automation that is restrictive beyond what was 
intended [08]: “A far more dystopian vision is one 
where lawmakers turn microdirectives into physical 
restraints on behavior. Rather than commanding which 
action should be taken, the individual is restrained 
from undertaking actions that do not comply with the 
law. Instead of simply telling the doctor that surgery is 
not the wisest course of action and that performing 
surgery will constitute negligence, imagine now that 
the medical technology required to perform the 
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surgery is automatically switched off, denying the 
doctor the possibility of performing the surgery.” 
 
All told, the upside potential for legal micro-directives 
in light of the potential adverse consequences of the 
adoption of legal micro-directives, merits additional 
research [08]: “The consequences relating to morality, 
privacy, and autonomy should be addressed before 
micro-directives arrive.” 
 
The next section of this paper introduces the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning, doing so to 
then aid Section 3 that explores how legal micro-
directives might vary across the levels of autonomy. 
Section 3 also covers more introspection of the legal 
rules versus legal standards facets and examines how 
legal micro-directives might be entailed via a 
macroscopic process flow indication. Also, the 
potential for brittleness in the use of legal micro-
directives is identified, including potential mitigations 
or remedies that might be leveraged. 
 
 
2 Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning 
 
In this section, a framework for the autonomous levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning is summarized and is based on 
the research described in detail in Eliot [20].  
 
These autonomous levels will be portrayed in a grid 
that aligns with key elements of autonomy and as 
matched to AI Legal Reasoning. Providing this context 
will be useful to the later sections of this paper and 
will be utilized accordingly. 
 
The autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning are as 
follows: 
Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
2.1 Details of the LoA AILR 
 
See Figure A-1 for an overview chart showcasing the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning as via 
columns denoting each of the respective levels. 
See Figure A-2 for an overview chart similar to Figure 
A-1 which alternatively is indicative of the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning via the rows 
as depicting the respective levels (this is simply a 
reformatting of Figure A-1, doing so to aid in 
illuminating this variant perspective, but does not 
introduce any new facets or alterations from the 
contents as already shown in Figure A-1). 
 
2.1.1 Level 0: No Automation for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 0 is considered the no automation level. Legal 
reasoning is carried out via manual methods and 
principally occurs via paper-based methods.  
 
This level is allowed some leeway in that the use of 
say a simple handheld calculator or perhaps the use of 
a fax machine could be allowed or included within this 
Level 0, though strictly speaking it could be said that 
any form whatsoever of automation is to be excluded 
from this level. 
 
2.1.2 Level 1: Simple Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 1 consists of simple assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this category encompassing simple 
automation would include the use of everyday 
computer-based word processing, the use of everyday 
computer-based spreadsheets, the access to online 
legal documents that are stored and retrieved 
electronically, and so on. 
 
By-and-large, today’s use of computers for legal 
activities is predominantly within Level 1. It is 
assumed and expected that over time, the 
pervasiveness of automation will continue to deepen 
and widen, and eventually lead to legal activities being 
supported and within Level 2, rather than Level 1. 
 
2.1.3 Level 2: Advanced Assistance Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 2 consists of advanced assistance automation for 
AI legal reasoning. 
 
Examples of this notion encompassing advanced 
automation would include the use of query-style 
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Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine 
Learning (ML) for case predictions, and so on. 
 
Gradually, over time, it is expected that computer-
based systems for legal activities will increasingly 
make use of advanced automation. Law industry 
technology that was once at a Level 1 will likely be 
refined, upgraded, or expanded to include advanced 
capabilities, and thus be reclassified into Level 2. 
 
2.1.4 Level 3: Semi-Autonomous Automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 3 consists of semi-autonomous automation for 
AI legal reasoning.  
 
Examples of this notion encompassing semi-
autonomous automation would include the use of 
Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) for legal reasoning, 
the use of Machine Learning and Deep Learning 
(ML/DL) for legal reasoning, and so on. 
 
Today, such automation tends to exist in research 
efforts or prototypes and pilot systems, along with 
some commercial legal technology that has been 
infusing these capabilities too.  
 
2.1.5 Level 4: Domain Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 4 consists of domain autonomous computer-
based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
This level reuses the conceptual notion of Operational 
Design Domains (ODDs) as utilized in the 
autonomous vehicles and self-driving cars levels of 
autonomy, though in this use case it is being applied to 
the legal domain [17] [18] [20].  
 
Essentially, this entails any AI legal reasoning 
capacities that can operate autonomously, entirely so, 
but that is only able to do so in some limited or 
constrained legal domain. 
 
2.1.6 Level 5: Fully Autonomous for AI Legal 
Reasoning 
 
Level 5 consists of fully autonomous computer-based 
systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 5 is the superset of Level 4 in terms 
of encompassing all possible domains as per however 
so defined ultimately for Level 4. The only constraint, 
as it were, consists of the facet that the Level 4 and 
Level 5 are concerning human intelligence and the 
capacities thereof. This is an important emphasis due 
to attempting to distinguish Level 5 from Level 6 (as 
will be discussed in the next subsection) 
 
It is conceivable that someday there might be a fully 
autonomous AI legal reasoning capability, one that 
encompasses all of the law in all foreseeable ways, 
though this is quite a tall order and remains quite 
aspirational without a clear cut path of how this might 
one day be achieved. Nonetheless, it seems to be 
within the extended realm of possibilities, which is 
worthwhile to mention in relative terms to Level 6. 
 
2.1.7 Level 6: Superhuman Autonomous for AI 
Legal Reasoning 
 
Level 6 consists of superhuman autonomous 
computer-based systems for AI legal reasoning. 
 
In a sense, Level 6 is the entirety of Level 5 and adds 
something beyond that in a manner that is currently ill-
defined and perhaps (some would argue) as yet 
unknowable. The notion is that AI might ultimately 
exceed human intelligence, rising to become 
superhuman, and if so, we do not yet have any viable 
indication of what that superhuman intelligence 
consists of and nor what kind of thinking it would 
somehow be able to undertake. 
 
Whether a Level 6 is ever attainable is reliant upon 
whether superhuman AI is ever attainable, and thus, at 
this time, this stands as a placeholder for that which 
might never occur. In any case, having such a 
placeholder provides a semblance of completeness, 
doing so without necessarily legitimatizing that 
superhuman AI is going to be achieved or not. No such 
claim or dispute is undertaken within this framework. 
 
 
3 Legal Micro-Directives and AI Enablement 
 
In this section, the advent of legal micro-directives is 
explored in several respects. First, the role of AI as an 
enabler in the advancement and utility of legal micro-
directives is discussed. This discussion includes an 
indication of the alignment of the evolution of legal 
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micro-directives across the autonomous levels of AI 
Legal Reasoning. Second, the tradeoffs involved in 
legal rules versus legal standards are addressed. As 
part of that analysis, a process flow is proffered on the 
relationship between legal rules and legal standards as 
to their deriving the instantiation and promulgation of 
legal micro-directives. Third, a core set of potential 
brittleness facets of legal micro-directives is identified. 
Also, those brittleness concerns are then sought to be 
overcome via recommended mitigation or remedies, 
aiming to arrive at a more robust approach to the 
adoption and use of legal micro-directives. 
 
A series of figures are included in the discussions to 
aid in illustrating the matters addressed. 
 
3.1 Legal Micro-Directives and LoA AILR 
 
As shown in Figure B-1, it is useful to align the 
evolution of legal micro-directives with the 
autonomous levels of AI Legal Reasoning. AI has the 
potential to aid in bolstering and strengthening the 
adoption of legal micro-directives, such that as AI 
Legal Reasoning improves over time the capabilities 
can be leveraged toward the creation, derivation, 
refinement, and application of legal micro-directives. 
 
For each of the levels of autonomy of AI Legal 
Reasoning, the impacts upon legal micro-directives 
will be distinctive. A keyword phrasing is used in 
Figure B-1 to indicate these impacts and consists of: 
 
LoA AILR – Legal Micro-Directives 
Level 0: n/a 
Level 1: Impractical 
Level 2: Incubatory 
Level 3: Infancy 
Level 4: Narrow 
Level 5: Wide 
Level 6: Consummate 
 
In brief, at Level 0, which consists of no automation 
for AI Legal Reasoning, the applicability to legal 
micro-directives is considered not applicable (“n/a”), 
simply due to the by-definition that there is no AI 
involved at this level. At Level 1, simple assistance 
automation, the characterization is indicated as 
“Impractical” since the AI is abundantly unrefined and 
unable to offer any substantive practical capacity to 
the legal micro-directive advent. At Level 2, advanced 
assistance automation, the characterization is indicated 
as “Incubatory” since the AI at this level can modestly 
assist in legal micro-directives but is considered quite 
preliminary in doing so. 
 
At Level 3, the first substantive impact of AI Legal 
Reasoning comes to work, and this is characterized by 
the keyword of “Infancy,” denoting that the AI is 
initially being used as a demonstrative enabler for 
legal micro-directives. Maturing at Level 4, the AI 
Legal Reasoning is now substantively augmenting the 
legal micro-directives, yet does so only within 
particular legal domains, thus this is characterized as 
being “Narrow” in its impact. Upon Level 5, 
encompassing all legal domains, the AI Legal 
Reasoning has now infused across all legal micro-
directives and characterized as now being “Wide” in 
its scope and velocity. Finally, at Level 6, the 
superhuman AI Legal Reasoning, the advent of micro-
directives would be considered “Consummate,” 
though keep in mind that Level 6 is a speculative 
notion and it is not clear as to what the superhuman 
capacity would bring forth. 
 
To reiterate and clarify, these depictions are not 
prescriptive and do not intend to predict what will 
happen, and instead are a form of taxonomy to depict 
and describe what might happen and provide an 
ontological means to understand such phenomena if it 
should so arise. 
 
3.2 Quadrants of Legal Rules Versus Legal 
Standards 
 
As shown in Figure B-2, a four-square set of 
quadrants is indicative of the tradeoffs of legal rules 
versus legal standards. Along the rows are the two 
states or conditions consisting of Legal Rules and the 
No Legal Rules status. Along the columns are the two 
states or conditions consisting of Legal Standards and 
the No Legal Standards status. In combination, there 
are then four distinct possibilities as represented in the 
four-square quadrants. 
 
In this case, the quadrants are characterized in this 
manner: 
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 Four-square Quadrant of Legal Rules versus 
Legal Standards 
• Legal Rules: Legal Standards  
    Lawful (via stasis) 
• No Legal Rules: No Legal Standards 
    Lawlessness (a vacuum) 
• Legal Rules: No Legal Standards 
    Infinite Conundrum 
• Legal Standards: No Legal Rules 
    Vagueness Quandary 
 
In brief, the next subsections consider each of the 
respective use cases.  
 
 
3.2.1 Legal Rules: Legal Standards – Lawful (via 
stasis) 
 
In this use case, when there are Legal Rules and Legal 
Standards, the presumption is that this will lead to a 
state of being lawful, at least concerning guiding as to 
what is considered lawful behavior. To provide a 
semblance of a legal direction, the Legal Rules and 
Legal Standards should be aligned or harmonized, 
otherwise, there is a potential for confounding of legal 
micro-directives that attempt to convey what is 
intrinsically misaligned. To be clear, if there is no 
overlap or intersection of some Legal Standard and 
some Legal Rule, this implies that there would not be a 
misalignment per se, since there is no semblance of 
alignment inherently involved. Overall, for the lawful 
facet to be sustainable the Legal Rules and Legal 
Standards need to maintain some form of stasis. 
 
 
3.2.2 No Legal Rules: No Legal Standards – 
Lawlessness (a vacuum) 
 
In this use case, when there are No Legal Rules and 
No Legal Standards, the presumption is that this will 
lead to a state of being lawless since there is a vacuum 
as to what the legal rules are and what the legal 
standards are. Behavior is apparently allowed to free-
range and does so without any guidance as to what is 
considered legally abiding. In this instance, the legal 
micro-directives would consist of an empty set. 
 
 
3.2.3 Legal Rules: No Legal Standards – Infinite 
Conundrum 
 
In this use case, when there are Legal Rules and No 
Legal Standards, the presumption is that this is 
potentially viable though raises the question of what 
the legal rules are predicated upon. In theory, 
overarching legal standards are the cornerstone for the 
formulation and cohesion of legal rules, without which 
the legal rules might seem arbitrary and seemingly 
absent of any overall pattern. In addition, legal rules 
without any corresponding legal standards can produce 
the so-called infinite conundrum. Namely, the number 
of legal rules might become massive, doing so to a 
degree that they potentially seem random and 
haphazard, lacking a structure or basis, and could 
stretch seemingly endlessly. The resultant legal micro-
directives would potentially be perceived as a never-
ending set that has little or no rationale or underlying 
constituency. 
 
3.2.4 Legal Standards: No Legal Rules – Vagueness 
Quandary 
 
In this use case, when there are Legal Standards and 
No Legal Rules, the presumption is that this is 
potentially viable though raises the difficulty of 
vagueness about appropriate and inappropriate 
behaviors. Legal standards provide an overarching 
semblance of legal behavior and yet allow for leeway 
and flexibility, but within that latitude also rests the 
possibility of inappropriate behaviors and thus without 
definitive legal rules to provide guidance it is 
potentially the matter that behaviors will flaunt 
standards and egress into what is ultimately 
ascertained as a lawless activity. 
 
3.3 Macroscopic Process Flow of Legal Micro-
Directives 
 
As shown in Figure B-3 and Figure B-4, it is useful to 
consider a macroscopic process flow that might 
underly the advent of legal micro-directives.  
 
In Figure B-3, starting with the assumption that Legal 
Micro-Directives will flow from Legal Goals, there is 
a topmost process involving the creation of new legal 
goals. There is a baseline of existing legal goals that 
are utilized in the effort of new legal goals 
formulation. Once a new legal goal has been proposed, 
a legal micro-directives generator is invoked. There is 
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next a reconciling of the generated legal micro-
directives with the existing set of legal micro-
directives, and a looping back to the formulation of 
Legal Goals is undertaken to contend with any legal 
micro-directives unable to be reconciled. After the 
reconciling has been accomplished, the promulgation 
of the legal micro-directives can be performed. 
 
Figure B-4 is similar to Figure B-3, though this variant 
indicates the use of Legal Standards and Legal Rules, 
rather than the alternative proposition of Legal Goals 
and the elimination of Legal Standards and Legal 
Rules.  
 
In Figure B-4, starting with the assumption that Legal 
Rules will flow from Legal Standards, there is a 
topmost process involving the creation of new legal 
standards. There is a baseline of existing standards that 
are utilized in the effort of new standards formulation. 
Once a new legal standard has been proposed, a legal 
rules generator is invoked, along with producing the 
legal micro-directives that are being postulated. There 
must be a reconciling of the Legal Rules, such that a 
comparison is made with the existing set of Legal 
Rules, and as needed a loop back to the formulation of 
Legal Standards is undertaken. After the reconciling 
has been accomplished, the promulgation of the legal 
micro-directives can be performed. 
 
This is a macroscopic process flow and at a high-level 
does not encompass the variety of additional checks-
and-balances and other facets that would be utilized 
for a more detailed delineation of the processes and 
sub-processes involved. 
 
3.4 G.R.A.P.H.S. AI Enablement of Legal Micro-
Directives 
 
As shown in Figure B-5, AI enablement of Legal 
Micro-Directives consists of at least the following key 
AILR activities, denoted with an acronym of 
G.R.A.P.H.S. for convenience of reference: 
• Generate Legal Micro-Directives 
• Reconcile Legal Micro-Directives 
• Approve Legal Micro-Directives 
• Promulgate Legal Micro-Directives 
• Host Legal Micro-Directives 
• Suspend Legal Micro-Directives 
Each of these AI activities is increasingly capable at 
each of the respective AILR Levels of Autonomy as 
discussed in the prior section of this paper. Per the 
macroscopic process flow indicated in the prior 
subsection, the AILR would to some degree (per the 
respective LoA’s)  be able to generate legal micro-
directives, be able to reconcile legal micro-directives, 
be able to approve legal micro-directives, be able to 
promulgate legal micro-directives, and in addition be a 
hosting component that would be able to serve out 
legal micro-directives on an authenticated basis (as 
covered in the next subsection), and be able to suspend 
legal micro-directives (when so needed). Since the 
legal micro-directives would be considered a 
somewhat sacrosanct societal law renderer, the AI 
involved in the G.R.A.P.H.S. would need to be of the 
highest order of security, integrity, consistency, 
resiliency, etc.  
 
In essence, the AI is tantamount to being the law giver, 
as it were, though presumably the Legal Goals or 
Legal Standards are the cornerstone that is the basis 
for the laws; nonetheless any semblance of AI system 
instabilities such as AI system corruption, disruption, 
or other maladies or malfunctions would indubitably 
undermine the collective belief in the bona fide 
legality of the micro-directives and thus wholly 
undermine the legal underpinnings of the legal micro-
directives structure and philosophical foundation. 
 
3.5 Brittleness of Legal Micro-Directives And 
Potential Remedies 
 
As shown in Figure B-6, various brittleness effects 
can undermine the utility of legal micro-directives. 
This necessitates a consideration of the brittleness that 
can appear, along with how to mitigate or remedy 
these aspects, doing so to attempt at achieving a more 
robust advent of legal micro-directives. 
 
The brittleness effects are listed as: 
• Ripple effect 
• Amalgamation effect 
• Off-guard effect 
• Propagation effect 
• Wariness effect 
• Conflicts effect 
• Spoofing effect 
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In brief, each is described as: 
 
Ripple effect: Changes in Legal Standards or Legal 
Goals can produce a cavalcade of Legal Rules or 
Legal Micro-Directives changes, creating a massive 
ripple effect or torrent that is overwhelming and 
confounding 
 
Amalgamation effect: Existing Legal Rules or 
Legal Micro-Directives become embedded fabric in 
societal activities; new Legal Rules or Legal Micro-
Directives are disruptive to abiding with and costly 
or arduous to inure 
 
Off-guard effect: Caught off-guard by the 
unexpected appearance of new Legal Rules or Legal 
Micro-Directives, lack of notification and 
forewarning and potentially inappropriate notice to 
the nature of the lawful matters involved 
 
Propagation effect: Receiving of new Legal Rules 
or Legal Micro-Directives might encounter 
propagation delays, those seeking to heed are not 
provided a timely awareness, meanwhile still 
operating under the presumption of the validness of 
the prior set 
 
Wariness effect: Wariness toward new Legal Rules 
or Legal Micro-Directives if all Legal Rules or 
Legal Micro-Directives seem to be unstable and 
rapidly modified/revoked/suspended 
 
Conflicts effect: Multiple Legal Rules or Legal 
Micro-Directives that intrinsically conflict with each 
other 
 
Spoofing effect: Spoofing to make illegitimate 
Legal Rules or Legal Micro-Directives seem as 
official 
 
The overarching emphasis is that these and additional 
brittleness facets that could be identified are all 
potential limitations, constraints, or outright threats to 
the veracity of the deployment and acceptance of 
Legal Micro-Directives and could therefore weaken or 
entirely undermine the adoption of Legal Micro-
Directives. A concerted effort will be need to ensure 
that the manner of automation used for the enactment 
and enablement of the Legal Micro-Directives is able 
to address and mitigate or remedy these challenges. 
 
For example, potential means of remedying or 
mitigating these delineated adverse effects consist of: 
• Ripple effect: Reconciliation 
• Amalgamation effect: Disentanglement 
• Off-guard effect: Notification 
• Propagation effect: Attestation 
• Wariness effect: Stabilization 
• Conflicts effect: Harmonization 
• Spoofing effect: Authentication 
 
Details underlying each of these effects and their 
respective proposed remedies are described in Eliot 
[16] [17] [21].  
 
4 Additional Considerations and Future Research 
 
As earlier indicated, research by various legal scholars 
has advocated that the law might inevitably be 
transformed into legal micro-directives consisting of 
legal rules that are derived from legal standards. These 
legal rules are envisioned as being propagated via 
automation for everyday use as readily accessible 
lawful legal directives throughout society.  
 
This paper has examined and sought to extend the 
legal micro-directives theories in three crucial 
respects: (1) By indicating that legal micro-directives 
are likely to be AI-enabled and evolve over time in 
scope and velocity across the autonomous levels of AI 
Legal Reasoning, (2) By exploring the tradeoffs 
between legal standards and legal rules as the 
imprinters of the micro-directives, and (3) By 
illuminating a set of brittleness exposures that can 
undermine legal micro-directives and proffering 
potential mitigating remedies to seek greater 
robustness in the instantiation and promulgation of 
such AI-enabled lawful directives. 
 
Future research is needed to explore in greater detail 
the manner and means by which AI-enablement will 
occur, along with the potential for adverse 
consequences, including as conveyed the possibility of 
brittleness that could undermine the efficacy of legal 
micro-directives.  
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Additional research on the proposed mitigations or 
remedies of the legal micro-directive brittleness is also 
needed. If legal micro-directives are to be productively 
adopted, the full gamut of legal, economic, societal, 
and technological ramifications need to be sufficiently 
examined. 
 
About the Author 
 
Dr. Lance Eliot is the Chief AI Scientist at Techbrium 
Inc. and a Stanford Fellow at Stanford University in 
the CodeX: Center for Legal Informatics. He 
previously was a professor at the University of 
Southern California (USC) where he headed a multi-
disciplinary and pioneering AI research lab. Dr. Eliot 
is globally recognized for his expertise in AI and is the 
author of highly ranked AI books and columns. 
 
 
References 
 
1. Alarie, Benjamin (2016). “The Path of the Law: 
Toward Legal Singularity,” May 27, 2016, 
SSRN, University of Toronto Faculty of Law 
and Vector Institute for Artificial Intelligence. 
 
2. Alarie, Benjamin, and Anthony Niblett, Albert 
Yoon (2017). “Regulation by Machine,” 
Volume 24, Journal of Machine Learning 
Research. 
 
3. Ashley, Kevin, and Karl Branting, Howard 
Margolis, and Cass Sunstein (2001). “Legal 
Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence: How 
Computers ‘Think’ Like Lawyers,” 
Symposium: Legal Reasoning and Artificial 
Intelligence, University of Chicago Law 
School Roundtable. 
 
4. Baker, Jamie (2018). “A Legal Research 
Odyssey: Artificial Intelligence as Disrupter,” 
Law Library Journal. 
 
5. Ben-Ari, Daniel, and D., Frish, Y., Lazovski, 
A., Eldan, U., & Greenbaum, D. (2016). 
“Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law: 
An Analysis and Proof of Concept 
Experiment,” Volume 23, Number 2, 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology. 
 
6. Bench-Capon, Trevor, and Givoanni Sartor 
(2003). “A Model of Legal Reasoning with 
Cases Incorporating Theories and Values,” 
November 2013, Artificial Intelligence. 
 
7. Buchanan, Bruce, and Thomas Headrick 
(1970). “Some Speculation about Artificial 
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning,” Volume 
23, Stanford Law Review. 
 
8. Casey, Anthony, and Anthony Niblett (2016). 
“Self-Driving Laws,” Volume 429, University 
of Toronto Law Journal. 
 
9. Casey, Anthony, and Anthony Niblett (2017). 
“The Death of Rules and Standards,” Volume 
92, Indiana Law Journal. 
 
10. Chagal-Feferkorn, Karni (2019). “Am I An 
Algorithm or a Product: When Products 
Liability Should Apply to Algorithmic 
Decision-Makers,” Stanford Law & Policy 
Review. 
 
11. Chen, Daniel (2019). “Machine Learning and 
the Rule of Law,” in Law as Data: 
Computation, Text, and The Future of Legal 
Analysis (Michael A. Livermore and Daniel 
N. Rockmore eds.). 
 
12. Coglianese, Cary, and David Lehr (2017). 
“Rulemaking by Robot: Administrative 
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning 
Era,” Volume 105, Georgetown Law Journal. 
 
13. Deakin, Simon, and Christopher Markou 
(2020). “From Rule of Law to Legal 
Singularity,” University of Cambridge Faculty 
of Law. 
 
14. Douglas, William (1948). "The Dissent: A 
Safeguard of Democracy,” Volume 32, 
Journal of the American Judicature Society. 
 
15. Eliot, Lance (2016). AI Guardian Angels for 
Deep AI Trustworthiness. LBE Press 
Publishing. 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
16. Eliot, Lance (2020). “The Neglected Dualism 
of Artificial Moral Agency and Artificial 
Legal Reasoning in AI for Social Good.” 
Harvard University, Harvard Center for 
Research on Computation and Society, AI for 
Social Good Conference, July 21, 2020. 
 
17. Eliot, Lance (2020). AI and Legal Reasoning 
Essentials. LBE Press Publishing. 
 
18. Eliot, Lance (2019). Artificial Intelligence and 
LegalTech Essentials. LBE Press Publishing. 
 
19. Eliot, Lance (2020). “FutureLaw 2020 
Showcases How Tech is Transforming The 
Law, Including the Impacts of AI,” April 16, 
2020, Forbes. 
 
20. Eliot, Lance (2020). “An Ontological AI-and-
Law Framework for the Autonomous Levels 
of AI Legal Reasoning,” Cornell University 
arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.07328 
 
21. Eliot, Lance (2020). “Turing Test and the 
Practice of Law: The Role of Autonomous 
Levels of AI Legal Reasoning,” Cornell 
University arXiv. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.07743 
 
22. Eliot, Lance (2018). “Multidimensionality of 
the Legal Singularity: The Role of 
Autonomous Levels of AI Legal Reasoning,” 
Cornell University arXiv. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.10575 
 
23. Eliot, Lance (2018). “Singularity and AI,” July 
10, 2018, AI Trends. 
 
24. Eliot, Lance (2020). “The Role of Human 
Judgement as a Presumed Integral Ingredient 
for Achieving True AI,” March 9, 2020, 
Forbes. 
 
25. Gardner, Anne (1987). Artificial Intelligence 
and Legal Reasoning. MIT Press. 
 
26. Genesereth, Michael (2009). “Computational 
Law: The Cop in the Backseat,” Stanford 
Center for Legal Informatics, Stanford 
University. 
 
27. Hage, Jaap (2000). “Dialectical Models in 
Artificial Intelligence and Law,” Artificial 
Intelligence and Law. 
 
28. Kaplow, Louis (1992). “Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis,” Volume 
42, Duke Law Journal. 
 
29. Markou, Christopher, and Simon Deakin 
(2020). “Is Law Computable? From Rule of 
Law to Legal Singularity,” May 4, 2020, 
SSRN, University of Cambridge Faculty of 
Law Research Paper. 
 
30. McCarty, Thorne (1977). “Reflections on 
TAXMAN: An Experiment in Artificial 
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning,” January 
1977, Harvard Law Review. 
 
31. McGinnis, John, and Russell G. Pearce 
(2014). “The Great Disruption: How Machine 
Intelligence Will Transform the Role of 
Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services,” 
Volume 82, Number 6, Fordham Law Review. 
 
32. McGinnis, John, and Steven Wasick (2015). 
“Law’s Algorithm,” Volume 66, Florida Law 
Review. 
 
33. Mnookin, Robert, and Lewis Kornhauser 
(1979). “Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law,” Volume 88, Number 5, April 1979, The 
Yale Law Review. 
 
34. Mowbray, Andrew, and Philip Chung, 
Graham Greenleaf (2019). “Utilising AI in the 
Legal Assistance Sector,” LegalAIIA 
Workshop, ICAIL, June 17, 2019, Montreal, 
Canada. 
 
35. Reinbold, Patric (2020). “Taking Artificial 
Intelligence Beyond the Turing Test,” Volume 
20, Wisconsin Law Review. 
 
36. Remus, Dana, and Frank Levy, “Can Robots 
be Lawyers? Computers, Robots, and the 
Practice of Law,” Volume 30, Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics. 
 
 
13 
 
37. Rich, Michael (2016). “Machine Learning, 
Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the 
Fourth Amendment,” Volume 164, University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
 
38. Rissland, Edwina (1990). “Artificial 
Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a 
Model of Legal Reasoning,” Yale Law 
Journal. 
 
39. SAE (2018). Taxonomy and Definitions for 
Terms Related to Driving Automation 
Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles, J3016-
201806, SAE International. 
 
40. Sunstein, Cass (2001). “Of Artificial 
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning,” University 
of Chicago Law School, Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Papers. 
 
41. Sunstein, Cass, and Kevin Ashley, Karl 
Branting, Howard Margolis (2001). “Legal 
Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence: How 
Computers ‘Think’ Like Lawyers,” 
Symposium: Legal Reasoning and Artificial 
Intelligence, University of Chicago Law 
School Roundtable. 
 
42. Surden, Harry (2014). “Machine Learning and 
Law,” Washington Law Review. 
 
43. Surden, Harry (2019). “Artificial Intelligence 
and Law: An Overview,” Summer 2019, 
Georgia State University Law Review. 
 
44. Susskind, Richard (2019). Online Courts and 
the Future of Justice. Oxford University Press. 
 
45. Volokh, Eugne (2019). “Chief Justice 
Robots,” Volume 68, Duke Law Journal. 
 
46. Waltl, Bernhard, and Roland Vogl (2018). 
“Explainable Artificial Intelligence: The New 
Frontier in Legal Informatics,” February 2018, 
Jusletter IT 22, Stanford Center for Legal 
Informatics, Stanford University. 
 
47. Weber, Robert (2019). “Will the ‘Legal 
Singularity’ Hollow Out Law’s Normative 
Core?” CSAS Working Paper 19-38, Antonin 
Scalia Law School, George Mason University, 
November 15, 2019. 
 
48. Wolfram, Stephen (2018). “Computational 
Law, Symbolic Discourse, and the AI 
Constitution,” in Data-Driven Law: Data 
Analytics and the New Legal Services 
(Edward J. Walters ed.). 
 
49. Braithwaite, John (2002). “Rules and 
Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty,” 
Volume 27, Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy. 
 
50. D’Amato, Anthony (2010). “Legal 
Uncertainty,” Northwestern University School 
of Law, Faculty Working Papers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-3 
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